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I. INTRODUCTION
Freedom of expression has long been hailed as the most fun-
damental constitutional guarantee of the American populace. In
the global melting pot that is Miami, Florida, the free flow of ideas
and cultural exchange is critical to the maintenance of social,
political, and economic solidarity. In March 1996, Miami-Dade
County ("County") passed a series of ordinances now collectively
known as the "Cuba Affidavit" ("Affidavit"). These administrative
resolutions created policies that banned the County from entering
into contracts with firms doing business directly or indirectly with
Cuba. While not expressly discriminating against Cuban cultural
performances and Cuban modes of artistic expression, the Affida-
vit effectively facilitated an outright blockade against Miami cul-
tural entities possessing any potential or existent ties to Cuba.
Miami-Dade County's regulatory approach, however, proved
unworkable under the First Amendment. Although the County
sought to further isolate and antagonize Fidel Castro's Cuban gov-
ernment, the manifestation of that opposition in the form of artis-
tic and expressive restraint proved intolerable. In a rare exercise
of "thought control," Miami-Dade County effectively co-opted its
local government power "to set the [political and artistic]
agenda."1 Despite that United States citizens generally place a
high priority on First Amendment ideals, Miami's marginalized
Cuban community, as reflected by Miami-Dade County's actions,
seemed to support the County's unconstitutional restrictions.
Ironically, the Cuban Exile community championed the County's
1. NoAM CHOMSKY, NECESSARY ILLUSIONS: THOUGHT CONTROL IN DEMOCRATIC
SOCIETIES 48 (1989). Chomsky also notes generally that the basic presupposition of
political discourse in America as to foreign policy is that America's stance is guided by
a "yearning for democracy" and a "general benevolent intent[.]" Id. at 59. In the case
of Miami-Dade County, however, the materialization of that intent evidenced nothing
more than the desire of local politicians to squelch constitutionally protected artistic
and political expression associated with Cuba or Cubans.
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restrictive maneuvers, which essentially echoed the censorial
actions of Fidel Castro's Communist government that the Exile
community so abhors. Thus, two general questions arise regard-
ing the Affidavit: 1) What are the political and economic bounda-
ries that justify restrictions such as those imposed under the
Affidavit, and 2) What enables a democratic community's political
ideologies to effectively supersede the First Amendment?
Therefore, given the overwhelming Cuban constituency in
Miami, this Comment examines the socio-political institutions
that facilitated the passage of the Cuba Affidavit and the subse-
quent litigation regarding its constitutionality. This Comment
also evaluates the Affidavit against the backdrop of the First
Amendment, particularly on the grounds of freedom of expression,
censorship, and prior restraint. Finally, this Comment scrutinizes
the Miami-Dade County ordinances as violative of federal foreign
affairs policy, rendering the Affidavit unconstitutional under the
Supremacy Clause and the doctrine of federal preemption.2
II. THE POLITICS OF EXILE
Miami, Florida, is the capital of the Cuban Exiles.' Since
Fidel Castro's dramatic rise to power in 1959, millions of Cubans
have journeyed to South Florida, making the area the center of "ex
exilio, the Cuban exodus[.]"4 By retaining a visible presence in
both the financial and political arenas, Cuban immigrants have
steadily secured an unprecedented stronghold within the commu-
nity.' At the close of the 1970s, for example, Cuban-Americans, as
a collective population, constituted the wealthiest Hispanics in the
United States, far surpassing the previous economic successes of
other Latin American constituencies.'
Local Cuban power reached new heights in the 1980s, gaining
support via the Cuban voting bloc and organizations like the
Cuban American National Foundation, the Latin Builders Associ-
ation, and the Latin Chamber of Commerce.' Despite these pow-
erful successes, however, Miami's Cubans are still largely viewed
2. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. See generally McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316
(1819).
3. ROBERT M. LEVINE & Moists Asts, CUBAN MIAMI 3, 5 (2000).
4. Id. at 5.
5. See generally ALEX STEPICK, ET AL., THIS LAND IS OUR LAND: IMMIGRANTS AND
POWER IN MIAMI (2003).
6. LEVINE & AsIs, supra note 3, at 5-6.
7. GUILLERMO J. GRENIER & ALEX STEPICK III, Introduction to MIAMI Now!
IMMIGRATION, ETHNICITY, AND SOCIAL CHANGE 10 (Guillermo Grenier & Alex Stepick
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as immigrant newcomers.8 David Reiff, writing on Miami's cul-
tural communities, has suggested that despite the lay conception
of the Cuban community, "Cubans are probably the only people
who really do feel comfortable in Dade County these days ...
Miami is their town now ...."'
Miami's Cuban Exile enclave is deeply rooted in "highly dif-
ferentiated entrepreneurial activity.""° The number of Cuban-
American owned businesses in Miami is staggering, and the
notion of economic aggrandizement in the Cuban community pro-
vides great support for what has been deemed "institutional com-
pleteness."1' The ability of Miami's Cubans to live in essential
fiscal and social isolation has lead to increased entrenchment of
Cuban culture and ethnic solidarity, thereby drastically slowing
acculturation and inter-ethnic relations. 12 In fact, this self-insula-
tion from the prevailing culture has led to animosity both within
the Cuban community and in the greater Miami population at
large. As a result, despite decades of local and national pro-inte-
grationist measures, at least two parallel, yet incredibly distinct
communities subsist in Miami. 4
Much of this divisiveness has been attributed to the Exile ide-
ology, 5 which is bound by four fundamental characteristics:
III, eds. 1992). Three factors have been identified as contributing to this rise in
Cuban socio-political status:
1) Structural factors arising from the human capital Cubans
brought with them and their geographical concentration in
Miami;
2) The role of the United States government in providing aid to the
arriving Cuban refugees; and
3) The creation of a collective Cuban-American identity arising
from the interplay of the United States, State, and Cuban Exile
counter-revolutionary organizations.
Id. at 10.
8. Lisandro Pdrez, Cuban Miami, in MIAMI Now! IMMIGRATION, ETHNICITY, AND
SOCIAL CHANGE 86 (Guillermo Grenier & Alex Stepick III, eds., 1992).
9. Id. (citing DAVID REIFF, GOING TO MIAMI: EXILES, TOURISTS, AND REFUGEES IN
THE NEW AMERICA (1987)).
10. Id. at 90-91.
11. Id. at 91.
12. Id. at 91 & 93.
13. Id. at 90-94.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 94. See also RICHARD R. FAGEN, ET AL., CUBANS IN EXILE: DISAFFECTION
AND THE REVOLUTION 101 (1968) (stating that:
Self imposed political Exile arises from the confluence of four
phenomena: First, an individual must come to perceive his
conditions of life as intolerable or about to become so. Second, he
must attribute the shift from tolerable to intolerable conditions to
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1) The primacy of issues and concerns that deal with the
political status of the homeland;
2) Uncompromising struggle against and hostility toward
the current Cuban government;
3) Lack of debate allowed about the "Exile" ideology
within the community; and
4) Overwhelming support for the Republican Party among
Cubans in Miami. 6
Even years after the mass exodus from Cuba, Miami's Cubans
remain preoccupied with the political and social status of their
homeland. 7 Concerns with American policy toward Cuba, coupled
with the desire to eventually return thereto as a free people, have
led Miami's Cubans to preserve their political agenda through
high levels of participation in Miami's democratic processes. 8 It is
this "central role" in Miami-Dade County politics that propels and
encourages continual conflict and animosity along both party and
community lines. 9
III. THE EMBARGO
A. Historical Perspective: Political Hostility & Trade
Barriers
The United States trade policy with Cuba is based largely on
the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 ("TWEA").20 TWEA
delineates the powers granted to the United States President to
initiate extraordinary embargo measures against "hostile" coun-
tries during times of war.2' Enacted upon the United States' entry
the incumbent regime. Third, he must be able to conceive of an
alternative place of residence and a means for getting there.
Fourth, such an alterative must actually exist).
Id. at 101.
16. P~rez, supra note 8, at 95-96.
17. Id. at 95.
18. Id. at 102-103.
19. THE CuBAN AMERICAN POLICY CENTER, MIAMI MOSAIC: ETHNIC RELATIONS IN
DADE CouNTY 12 (1987).
20. Angela T. Puentes, Comment, The Politics of Music and Film: The Validity of
a Local Government's Cultural Embargo on Cuba, 31 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 253,
257 (2000).
21. Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, ch. 106, 40 Stat. 311 (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (2003)). Section 5(b)(1)(B) of TWEA authorizes the
President to:
[Ilnvestigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or
prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer,
withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or
dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect
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into World War I, TWEA was intended as a "permanent piece of
legislation to meet both present and future wartime and peace-
time conditions."22
In August 1960, shortly after his controversial rise to power,
Fidel Castro orchestrated a commercial coup in Cuba by national-
izing all large commercial industrial assets.23 From 1959-1961,
Cuba experienced "rapid economic transformation from a capital-
ist market economy to a centrally planned socialist economy."24
Because Castro's regime targeted the redistribution of Cuban land
then owned by several American super-industries, American hos-
tility towards Cuba's new economic policy escalated, culminating
in informal embargos in several industry sects.25 Opposition
towards Cuba and its economy was severely exacerbated by the
Soviet-Cuban trade agreement of February 1960.26 Through its
arrangements with the Soviet Union, the Cuban government
effectively circumvented American trade weapons by skirting
United States threats of economic sanction.27 The United States'
aggression, combined with the escalating Cuban-Soviet relation-
ship, proved detrimental under American Cold War policy, and as
a result, United States-Cuban economic relations swiftly
deteriorated.
America's relationship with Cuba exploded at the end of the
Eisenhower administration, resulting not only in a more pro-
nounced desire to destroy Cuba economically, but also an Ameri-
can movement to completely "destabilize and overthrow the
Castro government."29 On April 16, 1961, President John F. Ken-
nedy executed the plan he inherited from the Eisenhower admin-
to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign
country or a national thereof has any interest, by any person, or
with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States ....
See also Laura A. Michalec, Note, Trade with Cuba under the Trading with the Enemy
Act: A Free Flow of Ideas and Information?, 15 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 808, 808 (1992).
22. See Michalec, supra note 21, at 814 (citing IREDELL MEARES, THE TRADING
WITH THE ENEMY ACT 7 (1924)).
23. Muriel van den Berg, Comment, The Cuban Liberty & Democracy Solidarity
Act: Violations of Int'l Law & the Response of Key American Trade Partners, 21 MD. J.
INT'L L. & TRADE 279, 279-280 (1997).
24. DONNA R. KAPLOWITZ, ANATOMY OF A FAILED EMBARGO: U.S. SANCTIONS
AGAINST CUBA 35 (1998).
25. See id. at 36.
26. Id. at 36-37.
27. Id.
28. See id. at 37.
29. Id. at 45 (citing MORRIS MORLEY, IMPERIAL STATE & REVOLUTION: THE UNITED
STATES AND CUBA, 1952-1986, 72 (1987)).
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istration to permanently eliminate the Castro regime .3  As a
result of that now famous military failure at the Bay of Pigs, the
United States instituted policies of strategic isolationism, and in
September 1961, Congress passed a measure "barring assistance
to any country that aided Cuba, unless the president determined
that such aid was in the U.S. national interest."" Thereafter, on
February 3, 1962, President Kennedy officially executed Procla-
mation 3447,2 declaring a national emergency and subsequently
implementing a formal, national embargo against Cuba that was
attributed to the threat of Castro's aggressive regime.3
The preliminary impetus for the embargo was to wrestle away
Castro's power by prohibiting all parties subject to the United
States' jurisdiction from commercial transactions with Cuba, a
move Castro countered by beefing up existing links with the East-
ern Bloc.3 4 Under TWEA, the United States Treasury Depart-
ment, as administrative designee, delegated its authority to
regulate embargo directives to the Office of Foreign Assets Control
("OFAC"),3 1 which promulgated the Cuban Assets Control Regula-
tions ("Regulations") and indefinitely barred the flow of money
from the United States to Cuba.36 Under the current Regulations,
the only permissible United States-Cuban economic activities are
transactions executed pursuant to either a general or specific
licensing agreement granted exclusively by the Secretary of the
United States Treasury.37 The general licensing provision allows
individuals to engage in transactions without explicit OFAC
approval, but where controversial financial benefit may inure to
Cuba, specific licensing is required and only granted on a strict
case-by-case basis.3
Additionally, the Regulations require the rejection of licens-
30. Id. at 45.
31. Id. at 47.
32. Proclamation 3447, 27 Fed. Reg. 1085 (1962).
33. See Puentes, supra note 20, at 260. See also van den Berg, supra note 23, at
281; Michalec, supra note 21, at 814-815.
34. See van den Berg, supra note 23, at 281.
35. See Michalec, supra note 21, at 815. See also Puentes, supra note 20, at 260.
36. See 31 C.F.R. § 515.201 (2003). The statute notes that, "[for the purposes of
this part, the term, 'foreign country designated under this part' and the term
'designated foreign country' mean Cuba and the term 'effective date' and the term
'effective date of this section' mean with respect to Cuba, or any national thereof,
12:01 a.m., e.s.t., July 8, 1963." Id.
37. See 31 C.F.R. § 515.201(b) (2003).
38. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.542(c), 515.560(b), 515.565(b) (2003). See also Eric
M. Bland, Comment, Constitutionality of Regulating International Sports
Broadcasting: Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. v. Brady, 44 FED. COMM. L.J. 363, 366-367
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ing requests for "payment of television rights, appearance fees,
royalties, pre-performance expenses, or other similar payments
resulting from any public exhibition or performance in Cuba or
the United States."39 Functionally, this protectionist limitation
prevents Cuban-based artists and entertainers from receiving any
United States based remuneration,40 and stems from the concern
that money paid to Cuban artists will eventually siphon into Cas-
tro's government.4
When considered in conjunction with the Mutual Educational
and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 ("MECA"), however, the pay-
ment restriction portion of the Regulations inevitably elicits con-
flicting application of the law. Under the MECA, a federal
"cultural exchange" exception was created to grant protection to
items of educational and artistic interest.43 The Congressional
(1992) (discussing Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. v. Brady, 740 F. Supp. 1007 (S.D.N.Y.
1990)). It was explained therein that:
In 1988, Congress amended Section 5 of the TWEA, exempting
certain agreements from the reach of the statute. The Berman
Amendment limits Section 5 so it does not grant or "include the
authority to regulate or prohibit, directly or indirectly, the
importation ... whether commercial or otherwise, of publications,
films, posters, phonograph records, photographs, microfilms,
microfiche, tapes, or other informational materials, which are not
otherwise controlled for export."
In an attempt to comply with the Berman Amendment, the
Regulations were amended to authorize by a general license all
transactions relating to "informational materials." The definition
of "informational materials" excluded "intangible items such as
telecommunications transmissions;" the Regulations also
prohibited "transactions related to informational materials not
fully created and in existence at the date of the transaction." This
exception is critical. The Regulations still preclude the "remittance
of royalties or other payments relating to works not yet in being."
(emphases added) (internal citations omitted)).
39. See Michalec, supra note 21, at 816. See also 31 C.F.R. § 515.565(c) (2003).
40. See Puentes, supra note 20, at 260.
41. Some delineated rationales for TWEA and the Regulations are:
1) to deny Cuba or its nationals hard currency which might be used
to promote activities inimical to the interests of the United
States;
2) to retain blocked funds for possible use or vesting to the United
States should such a decision be made; and
3) to use blocked funds for negotiation purposes in discussion with
the Cuban government.
See Michalec, supra note 21, at 815 n.40 (citing Real v. Simon, 510 F.2d 557, 563 (5th
Cir. 1975) (footnotes omitted)).
42. See Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C.
§§ 2451-2461 (2003).
43. 22 U.S.C. § 2451 (2003).
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Statement of Purpose identifies that the Act "enable[s] the Gov-
ernment of the United States to increase mutual understanding
between the people of the United States and the people of other
countries by means of educational and cultural exchange ....
Theoretically, the legislation grants the President authority,
"when he considers that it would strengthen international cooper-
ative relations," to provide for educational and cultural
exchanges.4' Thus, while the Regulations financially restrict some
aspects of public performance and exhibition, the MECA sanctions
both the creation and reception of worldly cultural and artistic
enterprises. This confusing dichotomy underscores why the Affi-
davit, as discussed infra, eventually failed under judicial scrutiny.
B. Interpreting the Berman Amendment
Additional significant legislation, the Berman Amendment
("Amendment"),46 provides further grants and limitations regard-
ing cultural exchange between United States and Cuban parties.
The Berman Amendment explicitly denies the American Presi-
dent any authority to ban the importation of foreign artistic work,
44. Id. The Statement continues that the purpose of the Act is:
[T]o strengthen the ties which unite us with other nations by
demonstrating the educational and cultural interests,
developments, and achievements of the people of the United States
and other nations, and the contributions being made toward a
peaceful and more fruitful life for people through the world; to
promote international cooperation for educational and cultural
advancement; and thus to assist in the development of friendly,
sympathetic, and peaceful relations between the United States and
the other countries of the world.
45. 22 U.S.C. § 2452(a)(1)-(2) (2003).
46. 50 U.S.C. app § 5(b)(4) (2003), which reads in pertinent part:
The authority granted to the President by this section does not
include the authority to regulate or prohibit, directly or indirectly,
the importation from any country, or the exportation to any
country, whether commercial or otherwise, regardless of format or
medium of transmission, of any information or informational
materials, including but not limited to, publications, films, posters,
phonograph records, photographs, microfilms, microfiche, tapes,
compact disks, CD ROMs, artworks, and news wire feeds. The
exports exempted from regulation or prohibition by this paragraph
do not include those which are otherwise controlled for export
under section 5 of the Export Administration Act of 1979 [50 U.S.C.
app. § 2404], or under section 6 of that Act [50 U.S.C. app. § 24051
to the extent that such controls promote the nonproliferation or
antiterrorism policies of the United States, or with respect to which
acts are prohibited by chapter 37 of title 18, United States Code [18
U.S.C. §§ 791-799].
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instead guarantying the dissemination of tangible materials of
artistic merit from other countries, including Cuba. The Amend-
ment defines importable items as: films, phonograph records,
photographs, microfilms, microfiche, tapes, CDs, CD ROMs,
artworks, and other information and informational materials.47
On February 2, 1989, the Regulations were amended to com-
ply with the Berman Amendment,48 and all transactions relating
to "informational materials" became authorized under the afore-
mentioned general licensing provisions. 49 The definition of "infor-
mational materials" was defined to exclude "intangible items such
as telecommunications transmissions. " 0 Beyond that delineation,
however, there was no other interpretive guidance provided
regarding the definition of "intangible."51 If protection exists at all
for "intangibles," then, it emanates from existing or future legisla-
tive or judicial construction of the statutory phrase "other infor-
mation and informational materials."
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York attempted to define TWEA's broad language in Capital
CitiesIABC, Inc. v. Brady,5 and reaffirmed that OFAC could
authorize transactions by the issuance of specific licenses.53 In
Capital Cities, the court examined the validity of an agreement
between Capital Cities/ABC ("ABC"), then-owner of the ABC Tele-
vision Network, and the Pan American Sports Organization
("PASO"), the chief organizer of the Pan American Games. 4 In
1998, ABC placed a bid to televise the 1991 Pan American Games
to be held in Havana, Cuba, for 8.7 million dollars.55 The bid
agreement stipulated that seventy-five percent of ABC's payment
would remit to Cimesports, S.A., the Cuban entity responsible for
organizing the games. The nature of the agreement required
47. See generally Bland, supra note 38.
48. Id. See 54 Fed. Reg. 5229, 5231 (1989).
49. Id. See 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.206(a), 515.545(b) (2003).
50. Id. See 31 C.F.R. § 515.332(b)(2) (2003).
51. The Regulations as amended also prohibit "transactions related to
informational materials not fully created and in existence at the date of the
transaction." See 31 C.F.R. § 515.206(a)(2) (2003).
52. 740 F. Supp. 1007 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). See generally Pamela S. Falk, Note,
Broadcasting from Enemy Territory and the First Amendment: The Importation of
Informational Materials from Cuba under the Trading with the Enemy Act, 92 COLUM.
L. REV. 165 (1992).
53. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 740 F. Supp. at 1009. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R.
§§ 515.542(c), 515.560(b), 515.565(b) (2003).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. See also Puentes, supra note 20, at 258.
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ABC to notify OFAC of its proposed broadcast, to which OFAC
informed the television company that a specific licensing agree-
ment was statutorily required. 7 Despite its initial acquiescence,
ABC subsequently withdrew its specific license application, argu-
ing that OFAC's position was contrary to the Amendment's deline-
ated proscriptions. 8 Instead, ABC submitted its application in
compliance with the general licensing scheme, but OFAC refused
to sanction ABC's broadcast on those grounds; the overwhelming
probability of a transfer of United States assets to Cuba proved
too likely. 9
Under a Chevron60 deference analysis the New York District
Court noted that:
Where Congress has specifically addressed the precise
question presented in either the plain language of the stat-
ute or its clear legislative history, deference to a contrary
agency interpretation is neither required nor permitted...
[and the phrase at issue] 'other informational materials,'
[was] clearly susceptible to more than one reasonable
interpretation.61
Neither the Amendment nor its legislative history necessitated
Congressional deference, but the Court held that compliance with
OFAC's interpretation was required, unless, as ABC argued, "def-
erence [wa]s precluded by the First Amendment, or... [the] Regu-
lations as construed by the agency [weire so arbitrary and
irrational as to violate substantive due process."62 The court
opined on Congress' failure to elucidate a distinction between tan-
gible and intangible "information" and noted additionally that the
Amendment and its correlative history "foster the exchange of
ideas across national borders, [of which] there is no discussion of
57. Capital Cities/ABC Inc., 740 F. Supp. at 1010.
58. Id.
59. Id. See also Bland, supra note 38, at 367 (explaining that:
In other words, under the Regulations, [the American Broadcasting
Company (ABC)] could not remit royalty payments for a "live"
transmission, even though it could import videotapes of the [Pan
American] Games and make royalty payments to Cuba for the
videotapes without violating the embargo. Under a generous
interpretation of the congressional language, neither type of
transmission would be barred. According to the new Regulations,
the general licensing provisions only applied to news and "fixed"
works; for a live non-news broadcast, the network had to obtain a
specific license).
60. Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
61. Capital Cities/ABC Inc., 740 F. Supp. at 1011.
62. Id. at 1012.
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the limits ... 63
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida, in Cernuda v. Heavey,64 however, proffered an alternative
Berman Amendment interpretation. In that case, two hundred
paintings of Cuban origin were seized from the personal residence
and offices of Ramon Cernuda, an executive at Miami's Cuban
Museum of Arts and Culture.65 Prior to the seizure of Cernuda's
works, a dispute arose regarding an auction of similar art, as dis-
senters suggested that the sale of such work would violate
TWEA. 66 The controversial works were reluctantly withdrawn
from that auction, but Cernuda and other museum directors
became the subject of death threats, incumbent museum board
members resigned in opposition to the Cuban art, and the Cuban
Museum was arbitrarily subjected to city and state audits for
financial impropriety.67 When Cernuda attempted to comply with
the federal licensing scheme by petitioning OFAC for permission
to exhibit the works of dissident artists, OFAC failed to respond.68
The district court's analysis recognized Cernuda's argument
that the phrase "informational materials" was premised on First
Amendment principles, and "encompass[ed] original works of art,
thus exempting the acquisition of Cuban paintings from TWEA
prohibition or regulation."69 In holding that Cernuda's paintings
had to be returned, the court used "common sense" to renounce
the government's argument that art is limited to an aesthetic
dimension, and instead held that art is plainly a form of "informa-
tion."7" Thus, the district court reaffirmed that prohibitions on
ideas and information could not exist if, at base, they were
afforded First Amendment guarantees.71 Artwork, reasoned the
court, was like other forms of protected expression and shielded by
63. Id. at 1011.
64. 720 F. Supp. 1544 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
65. Id. at 1545-1546.
66. Id. at 1545.
67. Id. See also Cuban Museum of Arts & Culture v. City of Miami, 766 F. Supp
1121 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
68. Cernuda, 720 F. Supp. at 1546. See id. at 1546 n.4 (noting that Cernuda was
the only art dealer subjected to government seizure of his collection, and that the
directors of Latin American art for Sotheby's and Christie's in New York never
acquired licenses to auction works by Cuban artists prior to the controversy).
69. Id. at 1549.
70. Id. at 1550. The court held further that the paintings conveyed information
because of the very nature of the very persons who opposed their exhibition at the
Cuban Museum. Id. at 1551.
71. Id. See also H.R. REP. No. 100-40, 40, pt. 3, at 113 (1987).
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the First Amendment,72 thus reaffirming the Supreme Court's
notion that, "[ilf there is a bedrock principle underlying the First
Amendment, it is that the Government may not prohibit the
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself
offensive or disagreeable."73
C. LIBERTAD
Perhaps the most controversial United States regulation
promulgated against Cuba is the Cuban Liberty and Democratic
Solidarity Act of 1996 ("LIBERTAD") or the Helms-Burton Act.74
Passed in response to "international annoyance ' 75 with the Cuban
Democracy Act of 1992,6 LIBERTAD implemented increased
extraterritorial political and economic restrictions, decreased the
power of the President to unilaterally sanction Cuba, and pun-
ished foreign businesses that engage in business with Cuba.77
While strengthening the breadth of the Cuban embargo, however,
the Helms-Burton Act also purportedly relaxed sanctions on cul-
tural exchanges.' LIBERTAD's passage assisted "the Cuban peo-
ple in regaining their freedom and prosperity, as well as in joining
the community of democratic countries that ... flourish[] in the
Western Hemisphere[.1" The Act has reinvigorated the movement
to liberate Cuba from Communist oppression.79
72. Cernuda, 720 F. Supp. at 1550. See Serra v. United States Gen. Servs.
Admin., 847 F.2d 1045, 1048 (2d Cir. 1988). See also Piarowski v. Illinois Cmty. Coll.
Dist. 515, 759 F.2d 625, 628 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied 474 U.S. 1007 (1985) (holding
that "the freedom of speech and of the press protected by the First Amendment has
been interpreted to embrace purely artistic as well as political expression [ I and
entertainment that falls far short of anyone's ideas of 'art,' . . . unless the artistic
expression is obscene in the legal sense.")
73. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (protecting the burning of an
American flag when done for purposes of political expression).
74. 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-6091 (2003). See generally Kaplowitz, supra note 24, at 150-
162.
75. See van den Berg, supra note 23, at 282.
76. 22 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6010 (2003).
77. Kaplowitz, supra note 24, at 180.
78. See Michael Grunwald, Sounds of Political Discord: In Miami, Some Exiles
Hear a Different Beat out of Cuba, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 28, 1998, at Al (stating that,
"the Helms-Burton Act of 1994, which tightened most of the Cuban embargo, actually
loosened restrictions on cultural exchanges, and visits by Cuban musicians to the
United States have increased more than 500 percent.") (cited in Puentes, supra note
20, at 262).
79. 22 U.S.C. § 6022(1) (2003). The Purpose Statement continues:
The purposes of this chapter are ...
(2) to strengthen international sanctions against the Castro
government;
(3) to provide for the continued national security of the United
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IV. CONFLICTING APPLICATION OF THE "CUBA AFFIDAVIT" -
THE "RHYTHM IS GONNA GET You"8 0
In March 1996, the Miami-Dade County Board of County
Commissioners ("Commissioners") was presented with a proposed
administrative order, which, together with two subsequent resolu-
tions, became known collectively as the "Cuba Affidavit."" Robert
A. Ginsburg, County Attorney for Miami-Dade County, proposed
Administrative Order No. 3-12 to implement Miami-Dade County
Resolution No. R-202-96, which charged the County Manager with
reviewing local initiatives regarding Cuban trade policies. 2 Addi-
tionally, the proposal called for an eventual amendment of Admin-
istrative Order No. 3-12 to "provide that, to the extent allowable
by law, Dade County shall not knowingly enter into a contract
with any firm.., deemed to be doing business with Cuba.... .""
The decision to implement additional trade barriers was sur-
prising, as the State of Florida had previously adopted similar leg-
islation prohibiting financial investment and cooperation with any
company doing business with Cuba. 4 On its face, the Affidavit
States in the face of continuing threats from the Castro
government of terrorism, theft of property from United States
nationals by the Castro government, and the political
manipulation by the Castro government of the desire of Cubans
to escape that results in mass migration to the United States;
(4) to encourage the holding of free and fair democratic elections in
Cuba, conducted under the supervision of internationally
recognized observers;
(5) to provide a policy framework for United States support to the
Cuban people in response to the formation of a transition
government or a democratically elected government in Cuba;
and
(6) to protect United States nationals against confiscatory takings
and the wrongful trafficking in property confiscated by the
Castro regime.
Id. at §§ 6022(2)-(6).
80. GLORIA ESTEFAN & MIAMI SOUND MACHINE, Rhythm is Gonna Get You, on LET
IT LOOSE (Sony Records 1988).
81. Miami Light Project v. Miami-Dade County, No. 00-1281-CIV-MORENO, 2000
U.S. Dist LEXIS 8761 (S.D. Fla. May 16, 2000).
82. See Puentes, supra note 20, at 262 & 262 n.57 (citing Memorandum from
Robert A. Ginsburg, County Attorney, Miami-Dade County, Fla. to Board of County
Commissioners, Miami-Dade County, Fla. (Mar. 5, 1996)).
83. Miami-Dade County, Fla., Resolution R-202-96 (Mar. 5, 1996).
84. See FLA. STAT. § 215.471 (2003). The statute reads:
The State Board of Administration shall divest any investment
under § 121.151 and §§ 215.44-215.53, and is prohibited from
investment in stocks, securities, or other obligations of:
(1) Any institution or company domiciled in the United States,
or foreign subsidiary of a company domiciled in the United States,
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seemed to implicate questions of federal preemption and genera-
lized First Amendment issues. Indeed, under the Affidavit,
Miami-Dade County was the only local United States jurisdiction
barring contractual relationships with groups conducting business
with Cuban entities.85
A. Cuban Music in Miami
In addition to the political issues facing the Exile community,
Cuban musical expression headlined as a critical issue under the
Affidavit. 6 Originally, Miami's Cuban music was largely reflec-
tive of the 1960s Exile ideology, consisting of "old standbys" from
the Cuban homeland.87 Throughout the early waves of immigra-
tion, musical expression "allowed [native Cubans] to vent the
affect of Exile - the nostalgia and the disorientation and the sor-
row - without directly confronting its specific circumstances."88
The 1970s, however, brought a new era in Cuban music; first-gen-
eration Cuban-Americans began to prosper in their own right, and
musical expression celebrated a new heritage rather than lament-
ing the bygone Exile era. 9
Today, Cuban and Latin music have propelled Miami's music
scene to the international forefront. All major record labels and
distributors now have outposts in Miami, including Sony, WEA,
Universal, BMG, and EMI.9 ° Although the local Miami music
scene has yet to rival that of New York or Los Angeles in size and
scope, popular appreciation of Latin music continues to swell. In
doing business in or with Cuba, or with agencies or
instrumentalities thereof in violation of federal law.
(2) Any institution or company domiciled outside of the United
States if the President of the United States has applied sanctions
against the foreign country in which the institution or company is
domiciled pursuant to § 4 of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992.
Id.
85. See Puentes, supra note 20, at 263 (citing Alisa Valdes-Rodriguez, Latin
Grammy's Need a Venue: Miami Waits, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 30, 1999, at Fl) (internal
quotes omitted)).
86. LEVINE & Asis, supra note 3, at 123.
87. Id. at 124.
88. Id. (citing GusTAvo PREZ-FIRMAN, LIFE ON THE HYPHEN 104 (1994)).
89. Id. at 127. Among these new artists were Willy Chirino and Gloria Estefan.
This new brand of Cuban music was popularized with the aid of Super Q (WQBA), a
radio station launched to appeal to the younger Cuban American market. Despite a
shift in the younger demographic in the 1980s, elder Cuban Exiles maintained
allegiance to AM radio programming, music from the homeland, and radio soap
operas. Id. at 127-128.
90. Jordan Levin, Taking Tune Scene Seriously; Top Distribs, NARAS Pave the
Way, WEEKLY VARIETY (June 10 - June 16, 1996).
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1996, the opening of the National Academy of Recording Arts and
Sciences ("NARAS") branch in South Beach further connected
Miami's music giants to the national industry community;9' South
Beach is "Miami's Music Row."92
B. MIDEM Miami
MIDEM Latin America and Caribbean, subsequently
renamed MIDEM Americas, was an international music trade
show organized by the Reed MIDEM Organisation. MIDEM
Organisation was founded in 1965 and acquired in 1989 by Reed
International, a London-based multi-national publishing company
and the world's leading organizer of exhibitions and shows.93 The
Reed MIDEM Organisation is most famous for its MIDEM Cannes
conference, and the group currently coordinates nearly a dozen
other music exhibitions from its offices in New York, London,
Tokyo, Cannes, and Hong Kong.94 Like MIDEM Cannes, the
Miami show marketed Latin American, Caribbean, and other
international music, but provided the resources of the Cannes fes-
tival on a regional level to accommodate smaller music labels,
companies, and distributors.9"
David Bercuson, chairman of the local MIDEM Host Commit-
91. Id.
92. Id. According to the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), sales
of Spanish-only recordings jumped eleven percent in the first half 1999, while sales of
English works were and continue to be flat. Mary Sutter, Where is Spanish Recording
Capital?, WEEKLY VARIETY (Nov. 1 - Nov. 7, 1999). Cf. Press Release, Recording
Industry Association of America, RIAA Releases 2003 Latin Music Shipment
Information (Mar. 31, 2004), available at http://www.riaa.com/news/newsletter/
033104_2.asp (last visited Nov. 17, 2004) (noting that:
Net U.S. shipments of Latin music CDs from record companies to
retail outlets decreased 2.5 percent in 2003 while the dollar value
of those shipments decreased one percent, according to statistics
released today by the Recording Industry Association of America
(RIAA). Due in part to the music industry's increased focus on
addressing Latin music piracy around the country, the decline in
shipments of Latin music CDs was less than in previous years. In
2002, shipments of Latin music CDs decreased eight percent and
the dollar value of those shipments decreased 9.6 percent compared
to the previous year.).
93. Press Kit, The Second Latin America & Caribbean Music Market 1998 - Fact
Sheet: Reed MIDEM Organisation (August 1998) (on file with author).
94. Puentes, supra note 20, at 264. See also Jordan Levin, Latin Music Wave Rolls
Over Miami; Pop Music: The MIDEM Trade Show Turns the South Beach Area into a
Pulsating Sounding Board, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1998, at F2.
95. Interview with David Bercuson, Former Host Committee Chairman, MIDEM
Latin America and Caribbean, in Miami, Fla. (Sept. 22, 2004). See also Judy Cantor,
Cuba's Finest Banned, MiAmi NEW TIMES, Aug. 21, 1997.
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tee, rallied support for the 1997 MIDEM Latin America and Car-
ibbean conference by encouraging Latin music publishers, labels,
and music television stations located in Miami to participate in
MIDEM's event.96 Bercuson contacted Miami-Dade County's
Greater Miami Convention and Visitors Bureau ("Bureau") to gar-
ner support to bring MIDEM to Miami. After all, MIDEM was
known worldwide for its importance in the global music industry,
as well as the glamour of its events.97
On account of the Affidavit, however, the Bureau requested
that MIDEM bar all Cuban-based artists and organizations from
the 1997 exhibition.9 The Bureau's insistence on the Cuban ban
was nothing more than an attempt to sully the international flare
of the event." Resultant discord was further heightened by the
removal of Miami-Dade Film and Print Advisory Board member
Peggy McKinley from her post for suggesting that the County
exempt the festival from the Affidavit's proscriptions.' ° Eventu-
ally, officials from the Bureau stipulated that its pledge of one-
hundred and twenty-five thousand dollars in County grants and
corporate support would remain available only if MIDEM fulfilled
the Bureau's request to forbid Cuban entities from
participation.101
MIDEM's reluctant acquiescence to the demands of the Affi-
davit incensed the record labels, executives, and artists who had
been regular MIDEM participants for many years, for although
MIDEM agreed to ban Cuban music and executives from the con-
ference, international labels with access to Cuban repertoire
freely sold licenses to Cuban music; they were not engaged in
Miami-Dade County business, nor were they subject to its Affida-
vit.10 2 In response to local and international dissent, Mayco Vil-
lanfana, the Bureau's then-vice president for corporate
communications, argued that the County was well within its
rights to determine with whom it would and would not do busi-
ness. 10 3 MIDEM, however, had sustained significant damage to its
reputation as an international entertainment business organiza-




100. See Grunwald, supra note 78.
101. See Cantor, supra note 95. The Bureau estimated that MIDEM Miami would
feed seventeen and a half million dollars into the local community in the 1996-1997
fiscal years alone. Id. See also Interview with David Bercuson, supra note 95.
102. See Interview with David Bercuson, supra note 95.
103. Id.
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tion and trade show, and following that year's Miami conference,
the company felt compelled to rehabilitate its global image.104
Although the County and its Affidavit were responsible for the
ban on Cuban performers at MIDEM, it was the organization that
sustained the most serious criticism.
In 1998, when MIDEM returned to Miami as MIDEM Ameri-
cas, the organization sought no funding from the Bureau, instead
focusing on the importance of including Cubans in that year's
musical showcase and exhibition. 10 5 When it was announced that
Cuban performers would attend MIDEM Americas, local Cuban
radio lashed out at host chairman David Bercuson, calling him an
"Israeli Communist," and promising to demonstrate against the
inclusion of Cuban musicians in that year's conference. 106 On the
night of a Cuban musical performance during MIDEM Americas
1998, a full audience was forced to evacuate the Miami Beach
Convention Center concert venue merely twenty minutes into a
Cuban musician's performance due to a bomb threat.' 7 In spite of
all odds, however, Bercuson and his host team quickly reorga-
nized, and with just hours notice to the MIDEM delegates, a sec-
ond performance the next night went off without a hitch; Cuban
dissidents had no time to mobilize their guerilla force to protest.0 8
MIDEM Americas 2000 also included Cuban performances
and musical organizations, but prior to the 2001 conference,
MIDEM decided to retire its regional Miami event. The company
recognized that many of MIDEM Americas' attendees were simply
without the resources to attend the conference.0 9 In addition, sev-
104. Id.
105. See Jay Weaver, Cuban Musician to Play at Conference; Exiles Express Anger
at Trade Show Organizer for Getting Around Miami-Dade Ban, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft.
Lauderdale), Jan. 25, 1998, at B4. See also Interview with David Bercuson, supra
note 95.
106. See Interview with David Bercuson, supra note 95. See also Puentes, supra
note 20, at 264. The exclusion of Cuban music and musicians put a dark cloud over
the entire event. Bill Nowlin, head of Cambridge-based Rounder Records stated that:
While [he] underst[ood] that there [were] strong feelings among the
anti-Castro community in Miami, [MIDEM Miami was] an
international music conference hosted by a European organization,
and it [was] intended to be inclusive rather than to exclude. United
States government policy is that there should be free exchange of
recordings and publications between Cuba and the United States.
So this vocal minority is not only contradicting the wishes of the
attendees from around the world but also U.S. policy.
See Cantor, supra note 95.




eral European and Asian companies felt the conference had
become too focused on Spanish music, and therefore not a valuable
venue for the sale of their musical genres.11 The Affidavit's force
had taken its toll on the MIDEM Organisation.
C. Los Van Van
In 1999, Debra Ohanian, a Miami concert and event promoter
who became known as "Havana Debbie" in the Cuban community,
was determined to bring the Grammy award winning Cuban
dance/salsa band, Los Van Van, to Miami on the group's American
tour. Prior to Los Van Van's performance in October 1999, a
national NBC Nightly News report confirmed that many of
Miami's Cuban-American citizens, including local government
leaders, had attempted to cancel the band's concert.' Although it
had previously banned the performance altogether, the County, at
the last minute, advised the group and its promoter that the per-
formance could proceed if the group obtained a five million dollar
insurance bond."2 Even though Ohanian quickly obtained the pol-
icy, she was informed that in the interim, the initial concert venue
had been rented by Cuban Exiles opposing the performance." 3
Ohanian, despite protests from the Cuban Exiles, ensured
that Los Van Van played its concert at the Miami Arena. What
resulted was a culture war, later described as a scene from "an
abortion clinic." 4 All out hell ensued a day and a half before the
event when militant Exiles mounted an attack on concert-goers
that eventually included the throwing of "bottles, cans, rocks, and
baggies full of excrement.""' 5 Then-Miami Mayor Joe Carollo
fueled dissent by lashing out on local radio, saying, "Havana Deb-
110. Id.
111. See Puentes, supra note 20, at 263 (citing NBC Nightly News: Miami Trying to
Ban Performance by Cuban Musicians, NBC television broadcast, Oct. 9, 1999).
112. Id.
113. Id. It was stated that the Exile's plan was to oppose the concert by sponsoring
a showing of the anti-Castro film, "Liberty." Id.
114. Julia Reynolds, Miami's Music War: Cuban Americans Terrorize Cubans to
Keep Their Music Out of Miami, EL ANDAR, Summer 2000.
115. Id. Ohanian had every right to be angry about the Los Van Van situation, and
stated:
People keep saying all this money goes back to Castro. What they
don't realize is these musicians don't take one penny back. They
spend everything they have at Target, Toys R Us, and Sears. And
God forbid there's a special on VCRs at Wal-Mart; they clean the
whole place out. It's really a big boost for the local economy.
See Celeste F. Delgado & Jose L. Jimenez, Cuba Affidavit, MiAMi NEW TIMES, Mar.
16, 2000.
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bie knows this isn't about bringing Los Van Van to Miami. This is
about trying to cause problems in Miami and making Uncle Fidel
happy."' 16
In March 2000, in response to the excessive security fees that
Ohanian was forced to shell out to secure performance rights at
Miami Arena, the ACLU filed suit on her behalf in federal court."7
At issue was whether the Miami Police Department illegally
charged nearly thirty-five thousand dollars in excessive fees for
exterior security, all of which, argued Ohanian, should have been
charged to the City of Miami."" Howard Simon, ACLU of Florida
Executive Director, explained that, "[t]he Miami Police Depart-
ment responded to ... protestors by providing . . . SWAT-team
paramilitary presence to protect the band members and the
approximately two-thousand people who attended the festive, oth-
erwise peaceful concert.""19
Judge Lenard's order granting summary judgment in favor of
Ohanian noted that Ohanian was charged excessively for police
security, while the Cuban Exiles protesting the concert were not,
and according to Lenard, that alone was evidence of unfair fiscal
administration for event security. 20 At oral argument, the City of
Miami conceded that the fees "were calculated and charged ... in
an unconstitutional manner." 2' In a First Amendment victory,
Judge Lenard required reimbursement to Ohanian, and held that,
"the security fees charged to [Ohanian] by authorized and empow-
ered public officials resulted in a chilling effect on [Ohanian's]
First Amendment activity."'22 Judge Lenard went on to condemn
the inherent discrimination embedded in the Miami's fiscal
maneuver against Ohanian, making it clear that, "the First
116. See Reynolds, supra note 114.
117. Debra Ohanian v. City of Miami, No. 00-1114-CIV-LENARD/SIMONTON
(S.D. Fla. Nov. 25, 2003) (Order Granting Sum. J. for Pls.), available at http'//www.
aclufl.org/legislature-courts/legal-department/briefs-complaints/losvanvanorder1 125
03.cfm (last visited Oct. 20, 2004).
118. Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union of Florida, Federal Court
Arguments Set for Monday in ACLU Challenge to City-Imposed Security Fees at 1999
Los Van Van Concert (Dec. 12, 2002), available at http://www.aclufl.org/news-events/
archive/2002/losvanvanl2l2O2.cfm (last visited Oct. 20, 2004).
119. Id. Simon continued that, "[Miami didn't] have a right to impose a fee on
freedom of speech and increase the price tag for any speech that attracts
demonstrators." Id. See also Forsyth County, Georgia v. Nationalist Movement, 505
U.S. 123, 134-135 (1992) (holding that speech cannot be financially burdened any
more that it can be punished or banned simply because it might offend a hostile mob).
120. Debra Ohanian, No. 00-1114-CIV-LENARD/SIMONTON at 7.
121. Id. at 11.
122. Id. at 22-23.
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Amendment [wals alive and well - especially in the City of
Miami."123
D. The Latin Recording Academy's Latin Grammy
Awards
Established in 1997, the Latin Academy of Recording Arts
and Sciences ("Latin Recording Academy") was the first NARAS
international venture. 124 Headquartered in Miami, the Latin
Recording Academy is a multi-national association of musicians,
producers, engineers, and other recording professionals who are
dedicated to improving the cultural conditions for Latin music and
its makers.25 In 1999, NARAS announced its organization of the
Latin Grammy's award show to celebrate the international expan-
sion of the Latin music industry.126 The natural choice for the pre-
miere event was Miami, but NARAS quickly faced County
opposition. 127 It was reported that just days before the award
show, Miami lost the Latin Grammy's because the County feared
the threat of violence.'28 Presumably, if the premiere Latin
Grammy's event had taken place under the Affidavit regime, the
County would have responded with a hard line policy similar to
that exercised against the 1997 MIDEM event; Cuban musicians
would be barred from an event in a Miami-Dade public venue. 29
Despite Miami's prominence in the Latin music world, the Com-
missioners' interpretation of the Affidavit proved problematic, and
despite NARAS' assertion that Miami's then-new American Air-
lines Arena was its first choice for the show, the threat of the Affi-
davit's enforcement preempted NARAS from awarding the first
123. Id. at 23. See also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989)
(holding that music, as a form of expression and communication, is protected under
the First Amendment).
124. Latin Recording Academy, at http://www.grammy.comlatin-academy/ (last
visited Feb. 4, 2004).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See Interview with David Bercuson, supra note 95.
128. See id.
129. See Puentes, supra note 20, at 265 (noting that:
The County administrators' historical application of Resolution
202-96 would effectively ban the Grammy's and NARAS if any
Cuban artists were asked to appear at the event..., [and that] this
resolution 'would block Miami from providing police, fire, and other
key city services if the internationally televised awards show were
held at a venue that has received public money, which most major
arenas have.').
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Latin Grammy's in Miami. 3 '
As a result, it was estimated that Miami lost at least forty
million dollars in potential revenue. 3 1 In a meeting of Latin
music executives regarding the location of the first award presen-
tation, music mogul Emilio Estefan stated, "It's about music. As
an American, it's nice to have the freedom of speech, to welcome
everybody to this country. As a Cuban, my heart is sad with
what's happening in that country."'32 Bill Martinez, an immigra-
tion attorney who helps Cuban musicians set up United States
tours, reported that Estefan went on to say, "[but I cannot] sup-
port a dictator, or music that comes from the dictator's house.., if
Cuban musicians were going to be a part of [the Latin Grammy's],
I would not do anything to stop if from happening in Miami, but [I]
certainly [am] not going to support it because [I] do[n't] support
dictators ... "'33
On September 3, 2003, the Latin Grammy's finally arrived
home in Miami for the show's third consecutive "prime-time,
English-, Spanish- and Portuguese-language telecast on U.S.
television. 134
E. Florida International University-Miami Film
Festival
The 1997 Florida International University-Miami Film Festi-
val ("Festival") stirred unprecedented controversy when Festival
presenters organized a showing of La Vida Es Silbar ("Life is to
Whistle"), a movie created and sanctioned by the Cuban govern-
ment film agency.'35 The Miami Herald explained that the film,
"[was] widely interpreted to be subtly critical of Cuban society and
government."1 36 As a result, two days before the sold-out screen-
ing, County officials threatened, on the basis of the Affidavit, to
withdraw almost fifty thousand dollars in funding if the Festival
screening went forward. 1 7
130. Id.
131. See Reynolds, supra note 114.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See Latin Recording Academy, supra note 124.
135. See Puentes, supra note 20, at 266-267.
136. Jordan Levin, Miami-Dade Threatens to Cancel Film Fest Grant, ML4,Mi
HERALD, Feb. 25, 2000, at Al. See also Puentes, supra note 20, at 266 n.87 (explaining
that the film's three main players "explore the restriction of Cuban society in their
search for happiness in post-revolution Cuba, a highly restrictive and oppressive
government.").
137. See Puentes, supra note 20, at 267.
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Despite that Festival officials insisted no financial benefit
would inure to Cuba, the County's threat stood firm. Under the
Berman Amendment, showing the film was compliant with fed-
eral standards for film distribution and exhibition, as "the festival
receive[d] [the movie] for free from its U.S. distributor, New
Yorker Films, which in turn [paid] WANDA, a Spanish company
that ... co-produced the film in Cuba."138 Despite the promises of
grant withdrawal, the film eventually played to a sold-out
crowd. 139 In fact, County inquiries would never have occurred but
for The Miami Herald's investigation into why the presentation
failed to receive more intense scrutiny under the Affidavit. 4 °
F. Visual Artistic Expression
Paintings and other visual forms of expression, like music of
Cuban origin, also drew hostility from Miami's Exile community
during the County's Affidavit regime.' In a 1998 incident at an
auction at Miami's Cuban Museum of Art and Culture, Jos6
Juara, a member of Brigade 2506,142 obtained Manuel Mendive's
El Pavo Real. Reportedly, in the presence of five-hundred onlook-
ers, Juara took the painting outside the museum and set it
ablaze.' Eleven years after the event, Juara was quoted as say-
ing his actions were a political statement, and that "[he] burned
th[e] painting because [he] foresaw the ideological penetration
from communist Cuba that was beginning to take place in the
Cuban Exile community."'"
A similarly offensive incident occurred in 1999, when artist
George Sdnchez opened a gallery exhibit in the Coconut Grove
hangar where Bay of Pigs veterans were once welcomed home to
Miami. 1 Despite SAnchez's intention to "raise the consciousness
of Cuban Americans of his generation," he obtained several anony-
mous threats regarding his artistic depictions of the Bay of Pigs
138. See Levin, supra note 136, at Al.
139. See Puentes, supra note 20, at 267 (citing Rene Rodriguez & Charles Rabin,
Ban or No, 'La Vida' Film Fills Gusman, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 27, 2000, at B1).
140. See Puentes, supra note 20, at 267 (citing Levin, supra note 136, at Al;
Rodriguez & Rabin, supra note 139, at B1).
141. LEVINE & Asfs, supra note 3, at 129.
142. During the Bay of Pigs invasion, "Brigade 2506 was the self designation of the
Cuban Exiles who named their invasion force after the [identification] number of the
first training casualty." Bay of Pigs and Brigade 2506, at http://cuban-Exile.com/
menu2/22506.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2004).
143. See LEVINE & Asfs, supra note 3, at 129.
144. Id. (citing Lissette Corsa, Art to Burn, MIAmi NEW TIMEs 7-8 (Apr. 8-14, 1999)).
145. Id.
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maneuver.4 ' A mere five days after the exhibit opened, Sdnchez
was forced to close the hangar due to extreme vandalism. 147 Thus,
despite attempts to eradicate hostility within the Exile commu-
nity, heavy animosity exists, and the emblematic slogan "No Cas-
tro, No Problem" still prevails.
V. THE FIRST AMENDMENT ARGUMENT:
UNCONSTITUTIONAL CENSORSHIP OF CUBAN CULTURE
A. The First Amendment & Freedom of Expression
The Affidavit proves most problematic when examined under
the microscope of the First Amendment. Because the County rou-
tinely construed and invoked the Affidavit against artistic and
expressive media, the legislative policy operated as an unconstitu-
tional form of prior restraint, violating deep-rooted First Amend-
ment norms. The examples provided in Section IV, infra,
highlight the Affidavit's inconsistent application and its function
as a vehicle to preemptively stifle expressive ideology, a practice
characterized as the exercise of "censorial community values." 4 "
The Supreme Court stated in United States v. O'Brien'49 that:
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is
within the constitutional power of the Government; if it fur-
thers an important or substantial governmental interest; if
the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression
of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on
alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest. 15
0
Under an O'Brien analysis, the Affidavit violated safely guarded
First Amendment values, and instead of operating as a fiscal
blockade, the Affidavit served to eviscerate constitutionally guar-
anteed expression. The Court's language in O'Brien underscores
that government regulations are unconstitutional if their purpose
is explicitly related to the suppression of free expression. Not sur-
prisingly, then, the Affidavit fails under this rubric.'
146. Id.
147. Id. at 129-130.
148. See generally Amy Ruth Ita, Note, Censorial Community Values: An
Unconstitutional Trend in Arts Funding & Access, 61 OHIO ST. L. J. 1725 (2000).
149. 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
150. Id.
151. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971). In that
case, the Court reaffirmed that, "'[any system of prior restraints of expression comes
to [the Supreme] Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional
validity'" (citing Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)) and that
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While the Supreme Court has arguably ignored the Federalist
origins of the First Amendment, i.e., that the First Amendment
was intended to shield the federal government from state intru-
sion into matters protected thereby, the Court has acknowledged
the broad role of free speech and expression in the preservation of
democracy. 1 2 As advanced by constitutional scholar Alexander
Meiklejohn, this view of the First Amendment is bound up in the
notion that the free flow of information is essential to our system
of self-governance. 5 3 Thus, when political speech is implicated or
somehow affected by local government action, the courts generally
recognize the free speech rights of entities, for "the central func-
tion of the First Amendment is not to preserve individual rights,
but to protect our democratic society by permitting the free discus-
sion and debate of issues of public concern."154 As a result,
attempts by Congress and local governments to limit speech based
on content are subject to the strictest scrutiny, meaning that any
restrictive measure must be narrowly tailored to achieve a com-
pelling governmental interest;15   the hurdle is "well-nigh
insurmountable.' 56
B. The First Amendment, United States Foreign
Policy & State Encroachment on Federal Powers:
The Case of South Africa
Using a comparative analysis, it is helpful to explore the com-
monalties between the Affidavit regime and the South African
government's now-defunct apartheid policy. Apartheid
"[tihe Government 'thus carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the
imposition of such a restraint."' (citing Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S.
415, 419 (1971)). The Affidavit fails under this analysis, for again, even though the
Commissioners' policy may have been well-intentioned, it operated to preempt the
valid expression of ideas.
152. See Matthew C. Porterfield, Article, State and Local Foreign Policy Initiatives
and Free Speech: The First Amendment as an Instrument of Federalism, 35 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 1, 31 (1999).
153. Id. See also ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 77 (1965) (noting that, "the unabridged
freedom of public discussion is the rock on which our government stands.")
154. See Porterfield, supra note 152, at 156. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765 (1978) (pronouncing that, "[i]f a legislature may direct business corporations
to 'stick to business,' it also may limit other corporations - religious, charitable, or
civic - to their respective 'business' when addressing the public. Such power in
government to channel the expression of views is unacceptable under the First
Amendment.").
155. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 324 (1983) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry
Local Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
156. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 425 (1988).
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encouraged a system of "separate development," by which the
South African government denied black citizens the rights enjoyed
by white citizens in nearly every aspect of life.157 The South Afri-
can political machine supported and encouraged depriving blacks
of equal treatment in government representation, voting, housing,
employment, and education, in addition to denying the black pop-
ulation any guarantees of freedom of speech, assembly, and per-
sonal mobility.'58
To undermine South Africa's apartheid policy, American
national and local legislative policy was restructured, and
attempts were made to ban private and public actors from engag-
ing in activities which would further South Africa's segregationist,
anti-black stance.159 At issue, however, was the constitutionality
of several resolutions enacted by local governments; some of the
measures were perceived as violative of First Amendment free-
doms. Although many local anti-apartheid directives were consti-
tutional, discriminatory measures which suppressed political
speech and expression regarding South Africa and its policies did
not withstand judicial treatment.16 °
In Springfield Rare Coin Galleries, Inc. v. Johnson,1 61 the Illi-
nois Supreme Court examined Illinois' imposition of a discrimina-
tory tax on the sale of South African products as an expression of
disapproval of that nation's policies and a disincentive to invest in
157. See also Anne R. Bowden, Note, North Carolina's South African Divestment
Statute, 67 N.C. L. REv. 949, 950 n.5 (1989).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 955-56 (discussing divestiture in the context of North Carolina
legislative policy).
160. South Africa's apartheid regime was the target of incredible divestment
campaigns within the United States. Divestment laws required that state and local
entities sell financial interests in companies with South African operations. See
Jennifer Anderson, Article, Massachusetts Challenges the Burmese Dictators: The
Constitutionality of Selective Purchasing Laws, 39 SANTA CLARa L. REV. 373, 379
(1999). Despite extensive local and state legislation, the South African divestment
era did not produce growth in constitutional doctrine. It has been noted that few, if
any, of the municipal ordinances or state laws ordering divestment were struck down
as unconstitutional. See id.
As to the Cuba Affidavit, it is crucial to consider that:
In a time when most Americans feel increasingly alienated and
unable to effectively voice their concerns about federal policies,
[local] laws provide a means for citizens to take concrete action at
the local level. If the action is clearly incompatible with federal
policy, [as in the case of the Affidavitl Congress should preempt
the state law.
Id. at 408.
161. 503 N.E. 2d 300 (Ill. 1986).
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South African products.'62 The Illinois high court rejected the law,
explicating that the legislation was motivated by disapproval of
South Africa's apartheid policy and that by focusing on a single
nation, the ability of the United States to choose between a range
of policy options in developing its foreign relations was compro-
mised; the effect of the statute was to create an embargo or boy-
cott "outside the realm of permissible state activity."6 3 The
Illinois court strongly noted that condemnation of the political and
social policies of a foreign nation would never justify antagonistic
and unconstitutional suppression of a particular nation's ideolo-
gies, and that, "[n]o single state should put the nation as a whole
to such a risk."''
Using reasoning similar to that of the Illinois court in Spring-
field, a California appellate court held in Bethlehem Steel Corp. v.
Board of Commissioners.. that California's Buy American Act
("Act") was unconstitutional.'6 6 The Buy American Act required
that all contracts for public works be awarded only to contractors
who agreed to use or supply materials manufactured in the
United States.6 7 A xenophobic maneuver, the California Buy
American Act masked negative sentiment towards extra-territo-
rial cultures under the guise of economic sanction. 6 ' As to the
constitutionality of the Act, the California court held that, "state
encroachments upon . . .exclusive and plenary federal power
whether in the guise of a licensing requirement, a grant of exclu-
sive privileges or a franchise, or of inspection and fees therefore
have been stricken down." 69 Although the Act was dismantled
under a foreign affairs analysis, 7 ° First Amendment implications
162. See generally id.
163. Id. at 307. See also Bowden, supra note 157, at 969-71. In Springfield, the
Illinois high court noted the Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Pink,
wherein the Court held, "[T]here are limitations on the sovereignty of the States. No
State can rewrite our foreign policy to conform to its own domestic policies. Power
over external affairs is not shared by the States; it is vested in the national
government exclusively." Springfield, 503 N.E.2d at 305 (citing United States v.
Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942)).
164. Springfield, 503 N.E.2d at 307.
165. 276 Cal. App. 2d 221 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
166. See generally id.
167. Id. at 223-24.
168. Id. at 225.
169. Id. at 231 (noting generally Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1875); Brown v.
Maryland, 25 U.S. 419 (1827) Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824), and Hale v. Bimco
Trading, Inc., 306 U.S. 375 (1938)).
170. See Bowden, supra note 157, at 971 (explicating that the court's decision was
based largely on a review of the federal foreign affairs power, thus leading the court to
find the statute unconstitutional on the grounds that it effectively placed an embargo
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permeate the California court's opinion. The California court's
renunciation of the state's proprietary maneuver indicates an
unwillingness to allow economic embargoes to stifle trade with
countries that share divergent, even troubling, ideologies.'71
A third case regarding local action directed against South
African apartheid, New York Times Co. v. City of New York Com-
mission on Human Rights,172 examined the placement of newspa-
per advertisements as a direct violation of New York's powerful
anti-discrimination laws. The New York Commission on Human
Rights claimed that newspaper advertisements for employment in
South Africa were racially and politically discriminatory.'73 Fol-
lowing an inquiry into South Africa's employment practices and
processes, the Commission on Human Relations established that
the use of "South Africa" in employment advertisements was sub-
stitute code for the "principle of white supremacy."' Contrarily,
the New York Court of Appeals held that:
[Ilt [was] plain enough that the ordinance at issue... pro-
hibit[ed] the [e]xpression, directly or indirectly, of discrimi-
nation in employment advertising. The [New York] Times
may be held as an aider and abettor of discrimination only
it if published advertisements that expressed discrimina-
tion. None of the advertisements do so.175
The New York court noted that the use of the phrase "South
Africa" as a disguise for discrimination, however, was not at the
heart of the case, and instead, the court focused on the advertising
prohibition as a veritable economic boycott aimed at South
Africa.176 By ruling on those other grounds, the court avoided the
First Amendment issues advanced by the New York Times.1
77
on foreign products that amounted to state usurpation of the federal power to conduct
foreign trade policy). See also Bethlehem Steel, 276 Cal. App. 2d at 225.
171. See Bowden, supra note 157, at 971.
172. 361 N.E.2d 963 (N.Y. 1977).
173. Springfield Rare Coin Galleries, Inc. v. Johnson, 503 N.E.2d 300, 307 (Ill.
1986).
174. New York Times Co., 361 N.E.2d at 965.
175. Id. at 967-68 (emphasis added).
176. Id. at 968. The New York court continued further that, "[wlithout expressing
disapproval of the goal of the complainants and without expressing approval of the
invidious practices of the government of the Republic of South Africa, [the court]
would conclude that a city agency was without jurisdiction to make and enforce its
own foreign policy. Id.
177. Id. at 969. The dissent, finding that the advertisements were impermissibly
discriminatory, also held the First Amendment arguments inapposite, noting that,
"Even the most broadly defined concept of First Amendment rights, one which makes
no distinction whatever between commercial and noncommercial speech, cannot serve
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These aforementioned cases relating to local action against
South African apartheid in the 1980s indicate a judicial unwilling-
ness to allow economic sanction and foreign policy maneuvers to
effectuate barriers to constitutionally protected expression and
ideological exchange regarding extra-territorial governments.
Indeed, the opinions expressed in Bethlehem Steel and New York
Times Co. confirm that regulations which amount to unconstitu-
tional embargoes or boycotts are outside the realm of permissible
state activity.17 Judicial uniformity in this area follows from the
notion that although Congress has the power to override the First
Amendment in very limited circumstances, "neither the Com-
merce Clause nor the federal power to regulate foreign affairs can
plausibly be understood to constitute self-executing limitations on
free speech."179
Alternatively, it has been advanced, albeit unsuccessfully,
that if the First Amendment protects local expression in the field
of foreign affairs, then local legislators should be able to express
collective sentiment through resolutions similar to the Cuba Affi-
davit and the anti-apartheid legislation discussed herein.1 0 Con-
sistent with the notion that the United States speaks with "one
voice" '1 in its foreign affairs, statutes enacted as a collective
expression of policy would support that objective."8 2 However, reg-
ulations implicating the First Amendment as a part of such pro-
nouncements would be held unquestionably unconstitutional in
application.' 3 Thus, while some declarations by state and local
governments may be permissible under a foreign affairs analysis,
the discriminatory policies set in place by the Cuba Affidavit, in
addition to those in some of the anti-apartheid cases, fail under
the rubric of the First Amendment. Constitutionally guaranteed
artistic and expressive rights cannot be displaced by "one voice"
reasoning.
to protect the publication of discriminatory material such as that before [the court]
... Id. at 970, 973 (Fuchsberg and Cooke, JJ., dissenting).
178. See Springfield, 503 N.E.2d at 307.
179. See Porterfield, supra note 152, at 36. See also id. at 36 n.234 (citing Rust v.
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991)) (noting that the First Amendment itself does not
limit the ability of a government to promote particular ideas or points of view that
may not be universally held).
180. See Porterfield, supra note 152, at 38.
181. The "one voice" concept dates as far back as the beginning of the American
democratic process. See THE FEDERALIST No. 42 (James Madison) ("If we are to be one
nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to other nations").
182. See Porterfield, supra note 152, at 38.
183. Id. See also Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 135-137 (1966) (quoting New York
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
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C. Political Discourse and Prior Restraint
In the context of politicized speech, the Supreme Court has
routinely invoked the First Amendment to promote the free explo-
ration of ideas. After all, the inherent value of political discourse
is only realized when divergent viewpoints are critically and
openly aired. In Dennis v. United States,8 4 the Court reaffirmed
its American Communications Association v. Douds58 holding
that, "the basis of the First Amendment is the hypothesis that
speech can rebut speech, propaganda will answer propaganda,
[and the] free debate of ideas will result in the wisest governmen-
tal policies. It is for this reason that [the] Court has recognized
the inherent value of free discourse.' ' 6 The Court's analysis in
Dennis highlights the palpable benefit of ideological exchange. If
the Cuba Affidavit were allowed to stand as constructed, then the
only Cuban artistic expression accessible to the public would be
that sanctioned by the Commissioners, a stinging censorial
maneuver.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court's First Amendment juris-
prudence indicates that where First Amendment claims are
brought challenging the constitutionality of legislative acts, courts
must closely examine "the purpose" of the objectionable regula-
tion. "7 If a restriction on First Amendment freedoms is incidental
to the proper purpose of a regulation and not unnecessarily broad,
then the regulation will withstand a constitutional challenge. 8
Such was not the case with the Cuba Affidavit. The government
interest embodied therein was clearly related to the suppression
of free expression. The purpose of the Cuba Affidavit, while per-
haps not facially, was to serve as an outright ban on Cuban artis-
tic and political expression under the guise of economic sanction
and regulation. The "incidental" intrusions on First Amendment
freedoms were not "incidental," but severely limiting. Although it
could be argued that the Affidavit's purpose was a reasonable and
necessary political maneuver against Communist Cuba, the
unconstitutional suppression of ideas far outweighed the legisla-
tion's stated goals.'89
184. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
185. 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
186. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 503.
187. Am. Documentary Films, Inc. v. Sec'y of the Treasury of the United States, 344
F. Supp. 703, 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
188. Id. (citing Teague v. Reg'l Comm'r of Customs, 404 F.2d 441, 445 (2d Cir. 1968)
cert. denied 394 U.S. 977 (1969)).
189. See generally Brad R. Roth, The First Amendment in the Foreign Affairs
104
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Alternatively, some constitutional scholars have argued that
since the Commissioners were elected by "the people," they per-
formed a collectively sanctioned censorial function by enacting
Affidavit policy. 90 Running counter to that notion, though, is that
those members of the community who did desire exposure to
Cuban artistic expression were subject to unconstitutional
restraint under the Affidavit. Thus, a justification of "censorial
community values" 9' under the theory that the community, as a
whole, deemed Cuban artistic ventures as offensive is misplaced.
Validating such an assertion would unconstitutionally sanction a
form of blatant viewpoint discrimination.'92
As the Supreme Court held in Rosenberger v. Rector of the
University of Virginia,'9 3 "[wihen the government targets not sub-
ject matter, but particular views taken by speakers on a subject,
the violation of the First Amendment is all the more blatant.
Viewpoint discrimination is thus an egregious form of content dis-
crimination."'94 In the case of the Affidavit, the withholding of
County funds for failure to renounce Cuban ties represents the
unconstitutional disapproval of particular viewpoints. Although
administered as an economic and political tactic, the Affidavit, in
practice, prevented access to constitutionally protected, although
sometimes controversial, ideology. '
Realm: "Domesticating" the Restrictions on Citizen Participation, 2 TEMP. POL. & CIL.
RTS. L. REV 255, 255 (1993) (introducing the concept that:
Courts, constitutional scholars, and ordinary citizens of the United
States have long recognized the crucial role of free speech and free
access to information in a democratic polity. Without an airing of
the widest range of views and information, governmental actions
are shielded from proper review and evaluation, resulting in the
concentration of political power in the hands of dictatorial
authorities. A democracy requires that decision-making power be
widely dispersed, with citizens free to evaluate independently the
issues of the day, to associate with like-minded persons, and to take
appropriate action. Such action may involve organizing to defeat
elected officials whose decisions do not embody the citizens' values
or ideas .... ).
190. See generally Ita, supra note 148, at 1731-33.
191. See Ita, supra note 148, at 1729. As defined in that article, censorial
community values are those beliefs, standards, or morals valued by a group of people
with common interests used to ban art though the withdrawing of funding or access to
art after a government actor previously granted such funding or access. Id.
192. Id.
193. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
194. Id. at 829 (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992)).
195. See generally Ita, supra note 148. See generally Cuban Museum of Arts &
Culture v. City of Miami, 766 F. Supp 1121 (S.D. Fla. 1991). The Supreme Court has
held that:
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D. Where is the Clear and Present Danger?
It has been otherwise advanced that the Affidavit also with-
stood First Amendment scrutiny on the basis of a "clear and pre-
sent danger" challenge.19 In his now-famous Schenk opinion,
Justice Holmes held that, "[tihe question ... is whether the words
used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to
create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a
question of proximity and degree."'97 The argument that allowing
Cuban cultural and artistic undertakings to penetrate the commu-
nity would somehow result in a threatening spread of Communist
political theory is nonsensical.19 That theory hinges on an "undif-
ferentiated fear ... of disturbance, [which is constitutionally] not
enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression."'99 The
guiding principles in First Amendment jurisprudence are derived
from the very essence of free political and artistic expression. In
the case of the Affidavit, the actions of local Miami politicos
offended the fundamental responsibility of our governors to
ensure the unbridled exchange of ideas. For, as the Supreme
Court has pronounced:
The constitutional right of free expression is powerful
medicine in a society as diverse and populous as ours. It is
designed and intended to remove governmental restraints
from the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as
to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each
of us, in the hope that use of such freedom will ultimately
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them
beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them
as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to life,
liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of
worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be
submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
196. See generally Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
197. Id. at 52.
198. In his dissent in Abrams v. United States, Justice Holmes explicated that:
The principle of the right to free speech is always the same. It is
only the present danger of immediate evil or an intent to bring it
about that warrants Congress in setting a limit to the expression of
opinion where private rights are concerned. Congress certainly
cannot forbid all effort to change the mind of the country.
250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
199. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 23 (1971) (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969)).
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produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect polity
and in the belief that no other approach would comport
with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon
which our political system rests.2 °°
By implementing the Affidavit policy, the Commissioners sought
to exenterate these fundamental guarantees.
VI. A CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE: THE AMERICAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION OF FLORIDA RESPONDS
A. Initial Application for Relief
On April 5, 2000, the American Civil Liberties Union of Flor-
ida ("ACLU") resolved to challenge the Affidavit by suing the
County on behalf of a plaintiff class consisting of:
[AIll persons, organizations, and entities, including non-
profit and for-profit corporations, who wish to invite, pre-
sent, exhibit, promote, produce or otherwise offer educa-
tional, cultural, artistic, musical, balletic, dramatic,
symphonic, operatic, cinematic, or other cultural events
involving, directly or indirectly, Cuban nationals, but are
prohibited from doing so, or are penalized by the County for
doing so .... 2
The class sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202,
and 42 U.S.C. § 1988, in addition to asserting claims under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments and the Foreign Commerce
200. Id. at 24. The Cohen v. California Court continued that:
To many, the immediate consequence of ... freedom may often
appear to be only verbal tumult, discord, and even offensive
utterance. These are, however, within established limits, in truth
necessary side effects of the broader enduring values which the
process of open debate permits us to achieve. That the air may at
times seem filled with verbal cacophony is, in this sense not a sign
of weakness, but of strength.
Id. at 25. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-377 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring). See also Puentes, supra note 20, at 278 (recognizing that a state or local
foreign policy maneuver will not likely express the opinions of the entire community,
and that an official statement by local government may deter the expression of
divergent views so as to threaten First Amendment interested of community
members) (citing Andrea L. McArdle, In Defense of State and Local Government Anti-
Apartheid Measures: Infusing Democratic Values into Foreign Policymaking, 62
TEMPLE L. REV. 813, 837 (1989))).
201. See Verified Class Action Compl. for Decl. & Inj. Relief, Miami Light Project,
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and Supremacy Clauses of the Constitution.22 The plaintiffs com-
plaint asserted that since the Affidavit was the sine qua non for
obtaining any monetary assistance from the County, including the
County's Department of Cultural Affairs International Exchange
Grants, the plaintiffs' grant applications were preemptively and
unconstitutionally foreclosed from consideration." 3 As a result,
five claims for relief were brought forward, consisting of foreign
powers arguments, notions of federal supremacy, and assertions
of individual liberties.0 4
202. Id. at 2.
203. Id. at 6. The complaint further recognized that the County restrictions
specifically exempted contracts with air carriers that required use of Miami
International Airport and that the restrictions could be waived by the County
Commissioners only upon the request of a County agency (i.e., for purposes of health,
safety, welfare, economic benefit, or well being of the public.) Id. at 6-7.
204. The enumerated claims were as follows:
1) The [Miami-Dade County] Cuba Restrictions violate the foreign
affairs powers of the federal government by interfering with and
imposing additional restrictions upon the foreign affairs powers
exercised by the legislative and executive branches of the
government of the United States.
2) The [Miami-Dade County] Cuba Restrictions interfere with
foreign commerce by imposing restrictions on cultural commerce
with Cuban nationals that exceed the requirements imposed by
federal law; by restricting the flow of foreign cultural commerce;
by limiting cultural transactions with Cuban nationals that are
specifically protected by federal law; by discriminating against
foreign commerce contrary to federal laws regulating that
commerce; by interfering with "the federal government's ability
to 'speak with one voice' in foreign affairs, because [the Cuba
Affidavit] harms 'federal uniformity in an area where federal
uniformity is essential.'" (citing Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v.
Natsios, 181 F. 3d 38, 68 (1st Cir. 1999), af/d sub nom. Crosby v.
Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000)).
3) The [Miami-Dade County] Cuba Restrictions, by exceeding and
interfering with the federal laws regulating foreign commerce
with Cuban nationals, and the federal laws regulating foreign
affairs powers, violates the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution of the United States.
4) The [Miami-Dade County] Cuba Restrictions, by denying access
to facilities and to grants, violate the First Amendment because
the Restrictions are not content neutral; they constitute a prior
restraint upon the right of free association and speech; they give
unbridled discretion to public officials to decide whether or not
expressive activity will be permitted; and they permit County
officials to discriminate by suppressing disfavored speech, film,
music, art, theater, dance, educational and cultural events
based on content and on the nationality of the persons whose
speech, film, music, art, theater, dance or educational and
cultural performances are offered by Plaintiffs and the members
of their class.
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B. A Motion to Dismiss
The County filed a motion to dismiss in Miami Light Project
on April 28, 2000, asserting that the plaintiff class lacked stand-
ing. Judge Moreno noted that, "[t]he doctrine of standing serves
to 'identify those disputes which are appropriately resolved
through the judicial process.' ,,201 Although the County argued that
no standing existed for lack of a specifically named Cuban artist in
any grant application or venue reservation, Judge Moreno
rejected the County's assertions.2"6 Instead, the district court held
that, "but for the submission of the [Affidavit, the plaintiff class
was] ready, willing, and able to apply for... grant[s], [but that [t]o
require the submission [given the] certain denial of a grant appli-
cation would . ..be an exercise in futility."207 In denying the
County's motion to dismiss, Moreno noted the plaintiffs challenge
was "in no way hypothetical," and that a discriminatory policy for
County fund disbursement appeared to exist.28
C. Moreno's Magic: Poof! The Disappearance of the
"Cuba Affidavit"
1. Preliminary Injunction
On May 16, 2000, Judge Moreno issued a preliminary injunc-
5) The [Miami-Dade County] Cuba Restrictions, by exempting
contracts with air carriers that pertain to access to and from
Miami International Airport from the Cuba Affidavit
requirement, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment because the Restrictions create two
classes of persons, organizations and entities that are similarly
situated but are treated differently: those persons contracting
with the County who need not sign the Cuba Affidavit solely
because they are air carriers utilizing the Miami International
Airport and those, like the Plaintiffs and their class, who are not
air carriers utilizing the Miami International Airport and
therefore must sign the Cuba Affidavit as a condition of
contracting with the County in any way, including seeking
grants from the County or utilizing venues in the County that
require compliance with the Cuba Affidavit.
205. Miami Light Project, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8761, at *4 (citing Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). Lujan held that a party has standing
to sue in federal court when: 1) the plaintiff suffered "injury in fact" that constitutes
an invasion of a legally protected interest that is concrete, particularized, and "actual
or imminent, not 'conjectural or hypothetical,'" 2) there is a causal connection
between the injury and the conduct complained of, and 3) plaintiffs injury can be
"redressed by a favorable decision." Id. at *4-5.
206. Id. at *9.
207. Id. at *6-7.
208. Id. at *6, *9.
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tion in Miami Light Project, noting the likelihood that certain por-
tions of the Affidavit were violative of the Foreign Affairs, Foreign
Commerce, and Supremacy Clauses of the United States Constitu-
tion.20 9 The district court opinion held that, "the County [had to]
accept applications for grants submitted without those portions of
the [Affidavit] relating to lawful conduct with Cuba, [but that] the
County [could] enforce those provisions of the [Affidavit] relating
to unlawful travel to Cuba."2 10 Although the court recognized the
potential First Amendment and Equal Protection issues inherent
in the case, it refrained from opining on those claims in granting
the preliminary injunction.211
Instead, Judge Moreno outlined the underlying, problematic
foreign policy concerns presented by the Affidavit. Under the fed-
eral law which regulates commercial relations with foreign gov-
ernments, "[a] state law regulating foreign affairs which has no
more than an 'incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries' will
be [deemed] valid."212 The major inquiry for the district court,
then, was whether the requirements of the Affidavit directly and
seriously infringed upon the foreign affairs powers of the federal
government.
National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios,213 a First Circuit
case finding the Massachusetts Burma Law214 unconstitutional,
was directly on point at the issuance of the preliminary injunction.
Under that law, firms who engaged in business with Myanmar,
formerly known as the Nation of Burma, were designated as
"restricted,"215 thereby prohibiting Massachusetts firms from do-
ing business with any of the country's agencies or authorities. 216
The First Circuit, however, held that the Massachusetts restric-
tion unlawfully encroached on the federal government's foreign
affairs power, and swiftly invalidated the law.21 7
209. Miami Light Project v. Miami-Dade County, 97 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1176, 1178
(2000).
210. Id. at 1176. The injunctive order in no way required the County to fund Cuban
artists or sponsor Cuban cultural programs, but provided a mechanism to maintain
the status quo until the issues could be fully adjudicated on the merits. See id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 1179 (citing Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 434-35 (1968)).
213. 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999), affd sub nom. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade
Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
214. Act Regulating State Contracts with Companies Doing Business with or in
Burma (Myanmar) ch. 130, Mass. Acts 239 (1996) (codified at Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 7,
§§ 22G-22M).
215. Miami Light Project, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 1179.
216. Id.
217. See id. The First Circuit determined that the law invaded federal authority
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Recognizing similarities between the Massachusetts law and
the Affidavit, Judge Moreno used the reasoning of National For-
eign Trade Council to hold that, "the Cuba Affidavit significantly
exceed[ed] the scope of the United States embargo on Cuba,
[thereby] 'upsetting Congress' careful choice of tools and strat-
egy.' ' 21 Thus, noted Moreno, the Affidavit would likely fail as a
matter of federal preemption, for "when Congress legislates in an
area of foreign relations, there [exists] a strong presumption that
it intended to preempt the field." 19
2. Final Order
The Supreme Court heard oral argument in Crosby v.
National Foreign Trade Council220 on March 22, 2000, and handed
down its opinion on June 19, 2000.221 Under the doctrine of federal
preemption, the Court affirmed the First Circuit's ruling, holding
that, "[the Court] will find preemption where it is impossible for a
private party to comply with both state and federal law,222 and
where '[the challenged state law] stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives
because: 1) the law was designed to affect the affairs of a foreign country, 2)
Massachusetts was in the position to have an effect on foreign policy, 3)
Massachusetts may have been a bellwether for other states, 4) other countries and
international organizations protested the law, and 5) the Burma law was different
from existing federal economic sanctions. Id.
218. Id. at 1180 (citing Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 181 F.3d at 76). Primarily, the
district court held:
The impingement of the "Cuba Affidavit" on foreign affairs goes
beyond that of... the Massachusetts Burma Law... First, the law
was designed to specifically impact and affect the affairs of a
foreign country. Second, Miami-Dade County by its geographic
proximity to Cuba is in the position to have an independent impact
on foreign policy. Third, Miami-Dade County, like Massachusetts,
may be a bellwether for other states. Fourth, the "Cuba Affidavit"
is significantly more restrictive than the existing United States
embargo on Cuba. Finally . . . the "Cuba Affidavit" affects any
entity that ever interacted with Cuba or a Cuban national in the
second or third degree. As such the "Cuba Affidavit" is an
independent foreign policy that has more than an "incidental or
indirect effect" on Cuba.
Id.
219. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 76 (1941).
220. 530 U.S. 363 (2000) affg Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38
(1999).
221. See Miami Light Project, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 1179 n.7.
222. See, e.g., Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-143
(1963).
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of Congress."'223 Under the Supremacy Clause, the Court found
that the Massachusetts Burma Law provisions conflicted with
Congress' specific delegation to the President over Myanmar sanc-
tions and the development of a more comprehensive and multilat-
eral fiscal strategy.224 As a result, the law failed.
The decision of the Supreme Court in Crosby, however, was
not a bar to all future state and local boycotts affecting foreign
affairs. Because the Court chose preemption as its ground for
overturning the Massachusetts Burma law, the Court left states
free to legislate where Congress has not previously done so. 225 As
such, the narrow holding of the Court gave state and local govern-
ments some freedom to address the "denial of human rights in
other countries through boycotts and similar means.12  Where
that legislation impinges on the fundamental rights guaranteed
by the First Amendment, however, it will fail as an unconstitu-
tional exercise of restraint.
VII. CONCLUSION
As was indicated in Miami Light Project, the decision in
Crosby played a large role in Judge Moreno's final ruling on the
constitutionality of the Affidavit. A statement by the ACLU noted
that the plaintiffs in Miami Light Project were subject to similar
unconstitutional limitations.22 ' The Crosby standard was consis-
tent with the plaintiff class' interpretation of the Affidavit as an
intrusion upon fundamentally guaranteed rights.28 Following the
Court's Crosby ruling, Howard Simon, Executive Director of the
ACLU of Florida, stated that, "it [was] ... time to formalize the
removal of Miami-Dade County from the business of foreign policy
and end the persistent censorship of the arts in South Florida."29
223. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372-73 (2000) (citing
Hines, 312 U.S. at 67).
224. Id. at 374-78.
225. See Thomas A. Barnico, Article, The Road From Burma: State Boycotts After
Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 19 B.U. INT'L L. J. 89, 108 (2001). See also
Patrick J. Thurston, Note and Comment, National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios
and the Foreign Relations Effects Test: Searching for a Viable Approach, 2000 B. Y.
U. L. REV. 749 (2000).
226. Id. at 110.
227. Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union of Florida, Statement by ACLU
Attorneys Bruce Rogow & Beverly Pohl (June 19, 2000), available at http://www.
aclufl.org/news-events/archive/2000/index.cfm (last visited Oct. 20, 2004).
228. The Court in Crosby held that, "the state statute penalizes some private action
that the federal Act (as administered by the President) may allow, and pulls levers of
influence that the federal Act does not reach." Crosby, 530 U.S. at 363.
229. Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union of Florida, Judge Schedules
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On July 11, 2000, Judge Moreno announced that he would
issue a permanent injunction barring Miami-Dade County from
further enforcing the Cuba Affidavit. 230 The permanent injunction
noted that both parties agreed the Crosby decision was dispositive
of the issues surrounding the Cuba Affidavit, and that the Affida-
vit's requirements clearly violated the Supremacy Clause.231 The
final order held that, forthwith, Miami-Dade County was barred,
in perpetuity, from requiring submission of the Affidavit and
declining to enter into contracts based thereon.232 The permanent
removal of the Affidavit requirement was a triumph for the First
Amendment and for free expression in Miami-Dade County.
Without the Affidavit, the County and its Commissioners could no
longer sanction unconstitutional discrimination against Cuban
outlets of artistic and ideological freedom.
Emanating from the conflicts discussed herein is that the
First Amendment seeks to protect freedom of expression regard-
less of whether those expressing ideas are members of a popular
majority or an unpopular minority.3 3 The irony of the Cuba Affi-
davit case is that the County's preemptive stifling of artistic and
cultural expression is precisely the kind of anti-democratic behav-
ior the Cuban Exile community so rightly opposes in the first
instance.234 The questions raised in the Introduction to this Com-
ment may remain unanswerable, for the cultural traditions of
Miami's communities are deeply embedded and in many ways
unwavering. Indeed, the Affidavit controversy raised individual
consciousness within both the Cuban Exile and greater Miami
communities at large, hopefully prompting a surge of tolerance
rather than sustained animosity. While the significant results of
these controversial events may still remain unseen, one certainty
remains - the Miami Mambo rumbles on ....
Status Conference in ACLU's Miami Artistic Censorship/Cuba Ordinance Case (July
10, 2000), available at http://www.aclufl.org/news-events/archive/2000/cubaordinance
status0700.cfm (last visited Oct. 20, 2004).
230. See Permanent Inj. Barring Enforcement of the "Cuba Affidavit Requirement,
Miami Light Project, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8761 (S.D. Fla. May 16, 2000), available
at http://www.aclufl.org/legislature-courts/legal-departmentbriefs- complaints/cuba
ordinanceruling0700.cfm (last visited Oct. 20, 2004). See also Press Release,
American Civil Liberties Union of Florida, Judge to Bar Miami-Dade County from
Enforcing the Cuba Ordinance (July 11, 2000), available at http://www.aclufl.org/
news events/archive/2000/cubaruling0700.cfm (last visited Oct. 20, 2004).
231. See Permanent Inj. Barring Enforcement of the "Cuba Affidavit" Requirement,
Miami Light Project, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8761.
232. Id.
233. See Cuban Museum of Arts & Culture, 766 F. Supp. at 1130.
234. Id.
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